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Secure Transmission in MIMO Wiretap Channels
Using General-Order Transmit Antenna Selection
with Outdated CSI
Yuzhen Huang, Fawaz S. Al-Qahtani, Member, IEEE, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, and Jinlong Wang,
Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we propose general-order transmit
antenna selection to enhance the secrecy performance of multiple-
input multiple-output multi-eavesdropper channels with the out-
dated channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter. To
evaluate the effect of outdated CSI on the secure transmission
of the system, we investigate the secrecy performance for two
practical scenarios, i.e., Scenario I: the eavesdropper’s CSI is not
available at the transmitter, and Scenario II: the eavesdropper’s
CSI is available at the transmitter. For Scenario I, we derive
exact and asymptotic closed-form expressions for the secrecy
outage probability in Nakagami-m fading channels. In addition,
we also derive the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and
the "-outage secrecy capacity, respectively. Simple asymptotic
expressions for the secrecy outage probability reveal that the
secrecy diversity order is reduced when CSI is outdated at the
transmitter, and is independent of the number of antennas at
each eavesdropper NE, fading parameter of the eavesdropper’s
channel mE, and the number of eavesdroppers M . For Scenario
II, we make a comprehensive analysis of the average secrecy
capacity obtained by the system. Specifically, new closed-form
expressions for the exact and asymptotic average secrecy capacity
are derived, which are valid for general systems with arbitrary
number of antennas, number of eavesdroppers and fading sever-
ity parameters. Resorting to these results, we also determine the
high signal-to-noise ratio power offset to explicitly quantify the
impacts of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel on
the average secrecy capacity.
Index Terms—MIMO wiretap channel, physical layer security,
transmit antenna selection, Nakagami-m fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
IFORMATION transmission security has become a promi-nent frontier in wireless communications due to the broad-
cast nature of the wireless propagation environment. In
conventional communication systems, various cryptographic
schemes have been designed and applied to guarantee the
information transmission security in the upper layers assuming
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an error-free link in the physical layer [1]. However, traditional
cryptographic schemes based on complex mathematical func-
tions have become increasingly unreliable when the compu-
tational ability of eavesdropper becomes more powerful [2].
Based on this important observation, from the information-
theoretic point of perspective, physical layer security has been
introduced to strengthen the secure transmission of wireless
communications. The key idea behind physical layer security
is to exploit different characteristics between the main channel
and the eavesdropper’s channel [3]. The author in [4] first in-
troduced the concept of the wiretap channel and demonstrated
that perfect security can be achieved when the quality of the
eavesdropper’s channel is inferior to that of the main channel.
In an effort to further improve physical layer security, a
number of works have suggested the idea of incorporating
the multiple antenna technique into wireless communication
systems (see [5]–[8] and references therein). In [5], the authors
considered a general system model with each node being
equipped with multiple antennas and analyzed the secrecy
capacity of the Gaussian multi-antenna wiretap channel. In
[6], the secrecy performance metrics with maximum ratio
combining (MRC) scheme were examined in independent
Rayleigh fading channels. In [7], the authors investigated the
confidential communication in slow non-selection correlated
Rayleigh fading channel, and evaluated the effect of antenna
correlation on the secrecy performance such as the probability
of positive secrecy capacity and the secure outage probability,
respectively. In [8], transmit antenna selection (TAS) was
proposed to enhance physical layer security in multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels, and the secrecy
capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel was characterized
in non-identical Nakagami-m fading channels. The authors
in [9], [10] investigated the secrecy performance of MIMO
wiretap channels using transmit antenna selection with receive
generalized selection combining (TAS/GSC) in Rayleigh and
Nakagami-m fading, respectively. While these prior works
have significantly improved our understanding on the impact
of multiple antennas on the security performance of the
wiretap channels, the key limitations of these aforementioned
works are that they all assume perfect channel state informa-
tion (CSI) of the main channel at the transmitter and only a
single eavesdropper. Assuming Nakagami-m fading, a recent
work [11] analyzed the effect of outdated CSI on the secrecy
outage performance of multiple-input single-output (MISO)
wiretap channels with transmit antenna selection. However,
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one major drawback of [11] is that both legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper are equipped with a single antenna, and hence
the received diversity gain has not been understood well. In
addition, [12] also investigated the effect of outdated CSI on
the secrecy outage performance of MIMO wiretap channels
using transmit antenna selection with receive maximum ratio
combining in Rayleigh fading environments. However, it only
considered a single eavesdropper and neglected the impact
of channel fading severity on the secrecy performance of the
MIMO wiretap channels.
Different from all previous works, we propose a general-
order transmit antenna selection with receive maximum ratio
combining (TAS/MRC) for secure data transmission in MIMO
wiretap channels with multiple eavesdroppers in independent
and non-identical Nakagami-m fading. To make our analysis
more general, we take into account the realistic scenario of
only outdated CSI at the transmitter. Specifically, the motiva-
tions of adopting general-order transmit antenna selection not
the best transmit antenna selection are given as follows:
 The ranking of transmit channels may be inaccurate due
to the unreliable pilot signals, which are used to predict
CSI for diversity combining and antenna selection.
 Since only subset of CSI is sufficient to decide on the
suitable transmit antenna to satisfy a target quality of ser-
vice, hence, this selection criterion can reduce processing
complexity at the receiver.
 The best transmit channel may be unavailable or occu-
pied by other service requirements. Therefore, a possible
solution is to use other than the best channel in order to
avoid service interruption.
In doing so, to evaluate the effect of outdated CSI on the
secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels, we consider
two practical eavesdropping scenarios. That is, Scenario I (i.e.,
passive eavesdropping): the transmitter has no knowledge of
CSI about the eavesdropper’s link, and Scenario II (i.e., active
eavesdropping): the CSI of the eavesdropper’s link is available
at the transmitter1. For Scenario I, due to the unavailable of the
eavesdropper’s CSI, we investigate the secrecy performance
in terms of the secrecy outage probability. For Scenario II,
we take into account of the average secrecy capacity as the
principal secrecy performance, since the transmitter adapts its
transmission rate based on the global CSI to achieve perfect
secrecy. The main contributions of the paper are summarized
as follows:
 Scenario I: We first derive new exact closed-form ex-
pressions for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
and secrecy outage probability, and also provide an ap-
proximated expression for the "-outage secrecy capacity
of MIMO wiretap channels, which provide an efficient
means to evaluate the impact of key system parameters
on the secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels.
 Scenario I: To gain further insights, an asymptotic and
secrecy diversity analysis are carried out in the high
1Scenario II is particularly applicable in the multicast and unicast networks
where the users play dual roles as legitimate receivers for some signals
and eavesdroppers for others. The scenario has been broadly adopted in the
published works [13], [14].
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Fig. 1. System model.
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Based on the derived
asymptotic results, we find that the secrecy diversity order
is significantly affected by the outdated CSI and is inde-
pendent of the parameters related with the eavesdropper.
 Scenario II: We derive a new exact closed-form expres-
sion for the average secrecy capacity in independent and
non-identical Nakagami-m fading channels, which are
very general and are applicable to MIMO wiretap chan-
nels with arbitrary number of eavesdroppers, number of
antennas at each receiver, and fading severity parameters.
 Scenario II: To evaluate the effect of the main channel
and the eavesdropper’s channel on the average secrecy
capacity, we derive a new compact expression for the
average secrecy capacity in the high SNR regime, which
facilitates the characterization of the high SNR power
offset, and demonstrates that the high slope is one and is
independent of all system parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. The system model is
introduced in Section II. Section III formulates the problem
and presents a set of new analytical expressions for the key
secrecy performance. In Section IV, we provide numerical
results and discussions. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper and summarizes the findings.
Notations: We use bold lower case letters to denote vectors
and lower case letters to denote scales, respectively. The prob-
ability density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of a random variable (RV) X are denoted as
fX () and FX (), respectively. The symbol kkF denotes the
Frobenius norm, and E [] stands for the expectation operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a MIMO wiretap channel as illustrated in
Fig. 1, which consists of a transmitter (Alice), a legitimate
receiver (Bob), and M eavesdroppers (Eve). The number
of transmit antennas at Alice is represented as NA, and
the number of receive antennas at Bob and each Eve are
denoted as NB and NE, respectively. We assume that the
corresponding CSI of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel is known to Bob and Eve, respectively. Without loss of
generality, the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel are
assumed to be quasi-static fading channel with independent
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non-identical distributed block Nakagami-m fading, so that the
channel coefficients keep constant during the coherence time
of the channel. The overall general-order TAS/MRC scheme
is carried out in two phases [11], [12].
 TAS Phase: Since Alice has only a single radio frequency
(RF) chain, it has to send the pilot sequence one by
one for the channel estimation at Bob. We assume that
Bob can perfectly estimate the CSI corresponding to
each transmit antenna2. After that, Bob selects a transmit
antenna associated with the kth best instantaneous SNR,
and feeds back the corresponding antenna index to Alice.
The feedback information can be represented by a binary
vector with B = dlogNAe bits.
 Transmission Phase: During the information transmis-
sion, the CSI corresponding to the kth optimal antenna
should be estimated again for decoding at Bob. Using
the pilot tones in the data frame, Bob can obtain the
accurate CSI of the main channel and subsequently feed
back the instantaneous SNR of the main channel to Alice
for wiretap code construction.
Noteworthy, unlike the conventional general-order TAS/MRC
scheme without secrecy consideration, Bob also need to feed
back the received SNR value to Alice for wiretap code
construction, in addition to the kth optimal transmit antenna
index. In the following, the detail selection of transmit antenna
will be discussed3.
Let hiB (t) 2 CNB1 be the channel vector between the ith
transmit antenna at Alice and Bob at time t, and its entries
follow independent and identically distributed Nakagami-m
fading with fading severity parameter mB. Employing MRC
scheme, the instantaneous received SNR between the ith
transmit antenna of Alice and Bob is given by
biB = PA
2
khiB (t)k2; (1)
where PA denotes the transmit power at Alice and 2 denotes
the noise variance at each receive antenna. In this paper, the
general-order TAS criterion used is to select the kth highest
post-processing SNR for Bob, which is entirely determined by
the CSI of the main channel. As such, the index of the selected
antenna, k, is given by
k = kth argmax
1iNA
(biB) ; (2)
where kth argmax () denotes to select the kth optimal an-
tenna. As a result, the instantaneous SNRs of the main channel
and the mth eavesdropper channel can be, respectively, given
by
b(kB) = PA
2
khkB (t)k2 (3)
and
mE =
PA
2
khmkE (t)k2; (4)
2In practice, when the kth best instantaneous SNR is found, the estimation
process by Bob can be terminated due to the fact that the general-order TAS
is adopted in this work.
3To avoid the overhead of antenna selection and make analysis more
tractable, we propose an antenna selection based on the CSI of the main
channel.
where m 2 f1; : : : ;Mg, and hmkE is the NE  1 channel
vector between the selected kth transmit antenna at Bob and
the mth Eve, its entries follow independent and identically
distributed Nakagami-m fading with fading severity parameter
mE
4. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are no
cooperation between eavesdroppers5. That is to say, secure
data transmission between Alice and Bob can be achieved
under the condition of the quality of main channel is larger
than that of any eavesdropper’s channel. Hence, the end-
to-end instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel is
represented as
E = max
1mM
mE: (5)
According to [14], the achievable secrecy rate of MIMO
wiretap channels with multiple eavesdroppers is given by
CS =

CB   CE; b(kB) > E
0; b(kB)  E ; (6)
where CB = log
 
1 + b(kB) and CE = log (1 + E) are the
achievable instantaneous rates at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Please note, in practical systems, the general-order TAS
phase may exceed the coherent time of the channel. As a re-
sult, the main channel may have already changed the moment
when Alice receives the feedback of the kth optimal antenna
index due to the time-varying nature of the wireless channel.
In this case, the kth optimal antenna is selected based on the
outdated CSI, i.e., hiB (t  ) 2 CNB1, which denotes the 
time-delayed version of the current CSI, i.e., hiB (t). Without
loss of generality, we assume that (kB) = PA2 khkB (t  )k2
denotes the time-delayed version of the current SNR b(kB).
Hence, the relationship between (kB) and b(kB) can be
modeled as [15]–[17]
b(kB) = p(kB) +p1  !; (7)
where
!2 is Gamma-distributed random variable with same
variance (kB), and  is the correlation coefficient between
(kB) and b(kB). For Jake’s autocorrelation model, we have
 = [J0 (2f)]
2, where f represents the maximum Doppler
frequency, and J0 () is the zeroth-order Bessel function of the
first kind [18, Eq. (8.411)]. In addition, an important issue is
the construction of wiretap code in the case of time-delayed
feedback. To construct the corresponding wiretap code, Bob
has to feed back the current SNR value b(kB) to Alice during
the Transmission Phase. We assume that the feedback ofb(kB) is perfect, which is also adopted in [12]. Thus, Alice
will use the main channel capacity of CB = log
 
1 + b(kB)
to construct the wiretap code and transmit the signal at the
antenna selected based on hiB (t  ).
In the proposed MIMO wiretap channels, we consider two
practical eavesdropping scenarios, i.e., Scenario I and Scenario
II. For Scenario I and Scenario II, we take into consideration
4Noteworthy, we assume that the eavesdroppers are located in close
proximity to each other with same fading severity parameter mE and average
powers.
5Please note, if maximal ratio combining scheme between eavesdroppers is
adopted, the corresponding PDF and CDF of E are still Gamma distribution.
Thus, by following similar derivations for non-cooperation, the desired results
can be easily obtained.
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of the secrecy outage probability and the average secrecy
capacity, respectively, as the secrecy performance metrics of
interests. In the following sections, we will provide a detailed
analysis of these secrecy performance metrics.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In this section, we present a comprehensive investigation
on the secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels with
multiple eavesdroppers described in the previous section.
A. Preliminaries
Before delving into the details, we first present a set of
statistical properties of b(kB) and E, which will be frequently
invoked in the subsequent derivations.
Lemma 1. The exact PDF and CDF of b(kB) are given by
fb(kB) (x) = k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)
BX
i=0

B
i

   (B +mBNB)
  (mBNB + i)

mB
B
mBNB+i i(1  )B i
mBNB+B+i
 xmBNB+i 1e 
mB
B
x (8)
and
Fb(kB) (x) = k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)
BX
i=0

B
i

   (B +mBNB) 
i(1  )B i
BmBNB+i

(
1  e 
mBx
B
mBNB+i 1X
m=0
xm
m!

mB
B
m)
;
(9)
where B = E [iB] is the average SNR of the main channel,
 = NA + n   k + 1,  = 1 + (NA + n  k) (1  ), B =
NBmB 1P
q=1
nq, and
B =
NA+n kX
n1=0
n1X
n2=0
  
nNBmB 2X
nNBmB 1=0
(NA + n  k)!
nNBmB 1!

NBmB 1Y
t=1
(t!)
nt+1 nt
(nt 1   nt)! (10)
with n0 = NA + n  k and nNBmB = 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The exact PDF and CDF of E are given by
fE (x) = M
M 1X
v=0

M   1
v

( 1)vE
  (NEmE)


mE
E
NEmE+E
xE+NEmE 1e 
(1+v)mEx
E (11)
and
FE (x) =
MX
v=0

M
v

( 1)vE

mEx
E
E
e
  vmExE ; (12)
where E = E [mE] represents the average SNR of the
eavesdropper’s channel, E =
NEmE 1P
q=1
mq, and
E =
vX
m1=0
m1X
m2=0
  
mNEmE 2X
mNEmE 1=0
v!
mNEmE 1!

NEmE 1Y
p=1
(p!)
mp+1 mp
(mp 1  mp)! (13)
with m0 = v and mNEmE = 0.
Proof: The proof can be found in [16].
B. Scenario I: CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is not
available at Alice
In this subsection, we concentrate on the scenario, which
Alice has no knowledge of CSI about the eavesdropper’s
channel. Under this scenario, we investigate three important
metrics to evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered
system, i.e., the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, the
secrecy outage probability, and the "-outage secrecy capacity.
1) Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity: According
to [1], the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity of the
proposed model is given by
Pr (CS > 0) = Pr
 b(kB) > E
=
Z 1
0
Z x
0
fb(kB) (x) fE (y) dydx: (14)
Then, by substituting (8) and (11) into (14), and utilizing the
equation [18, Eq. (3.351.3)], the exact closed-form expression
for the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity can be derived
as (15) after some simple mathematical manipulations.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, (15) is a new
closed-form expression and is valid for general scenarios
with arbitrary SNR, arbitrary numbers of eavesdroppers, and
arbitrary numbers of antennas. Notably, in the following three
special cases, the derived expression for (15) can be reduced
to the foregone results.
 Case 1: When the best antenna selection (k = NA), a
single antenna at Alice (NA = 1), a single eavesdropper
(M = 1), Rayleigh fading (mB = mE = 1) is considered,
(15) becomes to [5, Eq. (3)] under the condition of perfect
CSI at Alice.
 Case 2: When the best antenna selection (k = NA) and
a single eavesdropper (M = 1) is considered, (15) can
be reduced to [8, Eq. (16)] under the condition of perfect
CSI at Alice.
 Case 3: When the best antenna selection (k = NA),
a single eavesdropper (M = 1), and Rayleigh fading
(mB = mE = 1) is considered, (15) becomes to [12,
Eq. (21)] under the condition of imperfect CSI at Alice.
This demonstrates the validation of our analysis and the
generality of our result.
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Pr (CS > 0) = k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)
BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
  (mBNB + i)

mB
B
mBNB+i i(1  )B i
mBNB+B+i

MX
v=0

M
v

( 1)vE

mE
E
E
  (mBNB + i+ E)

mB
B
+
vmE
E
 (mBNB+i+E)
(15)
Pout (RS) = k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)
BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
i(1  )B i
BmBNB+i

(
1 Me 
mB(2RS 1)
B
M 1X
v=0

M   1
v

( 1)vE
  (NEmE)

mE
E
NEmE+E mBNB+i 1X
m=0

mB
B
m

mX
u=0

m
u

2uRS
 
2RS   1m u  (u+ E +NEmE)
  (m+ 1)

mB2
RS
B
+
(1 + v)mE
E
 (u+E+NEmE))
(17)
2) Secrecy Outage Probability: The secrecy outage prob-
ability is defined as the probability that the secrecy capacity
falls below a predefined rate RS. Mathematically, it is given
by Pout (RS) = Pr (CS < RS), which can be further expanded
as
Pout (RS) = Pr
 
CS < RSj b(kB) > EPr  b(kB) > E| {z }
I1
+ Pr
 b(kB) < E| {z }
I2
; (13)
where I1 and I2 are represented as
I1 =
Z 1
0
Z 2RS (1+y) 1
y
fb(kB) (x) fE (y) dxdy (14)
and
I2 =
Z 1
0
Z y
0
fb(kB) (x) fE (y) dxdy: (15)
Now, by substituting (14) and (15) into (13), we have
Pout (RS) =
Z 1
0
Z 2RS (1+y) 1
0
fb(kB) (x) fE (y) dxdy
=
Z 1
0
Fb(kB)  2RS (1 + y)  1 fE (y) dy: (16)
Then, by utilizing the equation [18, Eq. (3.351.3)] and per-
forming some simple mathematical manipulations, the closed-
form expression for secrecy outage probability is derived
as (17). For the special case of a single antenna at Bob
(NB = 1), a single eavesdropper with single antenna (NE = 1
and M = 1), (17) reduces to [11, Eq. (19)]. In addition,
when perfect CSI at Alice ( = 1), the best antenna selection
(k = NA) and a single eavesdropper M = 1 is considered,
(17) reduces to [8, Eq. (28)]. Furthermore, (17) can also be
reduced to [19, Eq. (10)] with  = 1, M = 1, NA = NB = 1
and mA = mB = 1. On the other hand, when  6= 1,
(17) reduces to [12, Eq. (15)] with k = NA, M = 1 and
mA = mB = 1. These observations also prove the generality
of our analysis.
Although the exact closed-form expression for secrecy
outage probability is obtained, it is difficult to achieve more
insights from (17). Hence, in order to get more insights, we
turn our attention to the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
in the high SNR regime, i.e., B !1. We find it convenient
to give a separate treatment for the following two cases of
interest. Case 1: perfect feedback, i.e.,  = 1, and Case 2:
delayed feedback, i.e.,  6= 1.
Theorem 1. Based on (17), the secrecy outage probability at
the high SNR regime can be approximated as
P1out (RS) =

#1
 mBNB
B ;  6= 1
#2
 kmBNB
B ;  = 1
; (18)
where
#1 = kM

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nBmmBNBB (1  )B
  (mBNB + 1) mBNB+B
   (B +mBNB)
  (mBNB)
M 1X
v=0

M   1
v

( 1)vE
  (NEmE)

mE
E
NEmE
   (E +NEmE)

mE
E
E mBNBX
m=0

mBNB
m

( 1)mBNB m
 2mRS	

E +NEmE; E +NEmE +m+ 1;
(1 + v)mE
E

(19)
and
#2 =

NA
k

MmkNBmBB
[(NBmB)!]
k
M 1X
v=0

M   1
v

( 1)vE
  (NEmE)

mE
E
NEmE
   (NEmE + E)

mE
E
E kNBmBX
n=0

kNBmB
n

( 1)kNBmB n
 2nRS	

NEmE + E; NEmE + E + n+ 1;
(1 + v)mE
E

;
(20)
where 	(; ; ) is the confluent hypergeometric function of the
second kind [18, Eq. (9.211.4)].
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Proof: See Appendix B.
From Theorem 1, we present the following corollary.
Corollary 1. With the proposed antenna selection algorithm,
the achievable secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array
gain of MIMO wiretap channels are given respective by
Gd =

mBNB;  6= 1
kmBNB;  = 1
(21)
and
Ga =
8<: #
  1mBNB
1 ;  6= 1
#
  1kmBNB
2 ;  = 1
: (22)
Proof: By expressing the asymptotic secrecy outage prob-
ability as P1out (RS) = (GaB)
 Gd , the achievable secrecy
diversity order and array gain can be easily obtained.
Based on Corollary 1, we summarize the following remarks
to provide insights into the use of general-order TAS/MRC
scheme in the main channel under Nakagami-m fading chan-
nels.
Remark 1: When there is no feedback delay, the maximum
secrecy outage diversity gain of MIMO wiretap channels with
general-order TAS/MRC scheme is kmBNB. However, for
the case of delayed feedback, the secrecy outage diversity
gain reduces to mBNB. Please note that whether there exists
feedback delay or not, the secrecy outage diversity gain
of MIMO wiretap channels is entirely independent of the
parameter of the eavesdropper’s channel.
Remark 2: The number of antennas NE , the number of
eavesdroppers M , and the fading severity parameter mE have
no impact on the secrecy outage diversity. However, there
affect the secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels by
reducing the secrecy outage SNR gain.
Remark 3: To characterize the performance loss when the
number of antennas at Eve NE or the number of eavesdroppers
M increases to NE + 1 and M + 1, we define the following
ratio of secrecy array gain as
Ga (NE + 1)
Ga (NE)

dB
=
8<:
10
mBNB
log10

#1(NE+1)
#1(NE)

;  6= 1
10
kmBNB
log10

#2(NE+1)
#2(NE)

;  = 1
(23)
and
Ga (M + 1)
Ga (M)

dB
=
8<:
10
mBNB
log10

#1(M+1)
#1(M)

;  6= 1
10
kmBNB
log10

#2(M+1)
#2(M)

;  = 1
:
(24)
Hence, by using (19) and (20) together with (23) and (24), the
SNR gap can be easily evaluated when increasing the number
of antennas NE and the number of eavesdroppers M .
3) "-Outage Secrecy Capacity: For a typical delay-limited
wireless communications system scenario, "-outage secrecy
capacity is an appropriate metric to evaluate the secrecy
performance of MIMO wiretap channels. The "-outage secrecy
capacity is defined as the largest secrecy rate RS;max such that
the outage probability is equal to ". Mathematically, it can be
expressed as
Cout (") = RS;max; (25)
where Pout (RS;max) = ". Hence, substituting (17) into (25),
the outage secrecy capacity of MIMO wiretap channels with
general-order TAS/MRC can be easily obtained by numerical
evaluation.
Alternatively, to avoid using numerical root-finding, we can
apply Gaussian approximation to find a tight expression for
the "-outage secrecy capacity of the system. Firstly, the t-th
moment of b(kB) and E are respective given as (26) and
E

tE

=
Z 1
0
xtfE (x) dx
= M
M 1X
v=0

M   1
v

( 1)vE
  (NEmE)

E
mE
t
  (t+ E +NEmE)
(1 + v)
t+E+NEmE
:
(27)
Resorting to [20], the capacity of the main channel can be
expanded in Taylor series in terms of the expected value of
the effective SNR as
CB
 b(kB) = log2  1 + E b(kB)
+ log2e
1X
m=1
( 1)m 1
 b(kB)   E b(kB)m
m
 
1 + E
b(kB)m :
(28)
Then, the expectation of CB is approximated as
E [CB]  log2
 
1 + E
b(kB)  log2e D b(kB)
2
 
1 + E
b(kB)2 ; (29)
where D
b(kB) is the variance of b(kB). Furthermore, by
expanding C2B in Taylor series about the expected SNR and
applying the expectation operator, the second moment of the
capacity of the main channel can be approximated as
E

C2B

=

log2
 
1 + E
b(kB)2
+
D
b(kB) log2e 
1 + E
b(kB)2 log2
 
e
1 + E
b(kB)
!
: (30)
Then, according to (29) and (30), the variance of the capacity
of the main channel is given by
D [CB] 
(log2e)
2 D b(kB) 
1 + E
b(kB)2  
(log2e)
2 D2 b(kB)
4
 
1 + E
b(kB)4 :
(31)
Similarly, by substituting the corresponding parameters into
(29) and (31), we can get the expectation and variance of CE,
respectively. When CB > CE, secrecy capacity CS is also a
Gaussian variable due to the fact that it is a linear combination
of the two independent Gaussian variables. Hence, we have
E [CS] = E [CB]   E [CE] and D [CS] = D [CB] + D [CE].
Thus, a gaussian approximation of the CDF of the secrecy
capacity is
FCS (x)  1 
1
2
erfc
 
x  E [CB]p
2D [CB]
!
; (32)
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where erfc () is the complementary error function. Then,
according to the definition of the "-outage secrecy capacity,
and utilizing (32), we have
Cout (")  log2e

ln

B
E

  
2
B
22B
+
2E
22E

+
p
2log2e

2B
2B
  
2
B
44B
+
2E
2E
  
2
E
44E
 1
2
erfc 1 (2  2") ;
(33)
where B = 1+E
b(kB), E = 1+E [E], 2B = E hb2(kB)i 
E2
b(kB), and 2E = E 2E  E2 [E].
C. Scenario II: CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is available
at Alice
In this subsection, we consider the scenario, where Alice
has knowledge of CSI about the eavesdropper’s channel.
Different to Scenario I, the average secrecy capacity is taken
as the principal secrecy performance metric, since Alice can
adapt transmission rate according to both CSI of the main
channel and eavesdropper’s channel to achieve perfect secure
transmission.
1) Average Secrecy Capacity: By recalling the definition of
the achieved secrecy rate defined in (6), we have
CS =
Z 1
0
Z 1
z
[log2 (1 + x)  log2 (1 + z)]
 fE (z) fb(kB) (x) dzdx: (34)
To evaluate the above integrals, we adopt the same steps
developed in [21]. First, we evaluate the inner integral by ap-
plying integration by parts, and after applying some algebraic
manipulations, the average secrecy capacity can be represented
as follows:
CS =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
FE (z)
1 + z
Z 1
z
fb(kB) (x) dx

dz: (35)
By inserting (8) and (12) into (35), and performing some sim-
ple mathematical manipulations, the closed-form expression
for average secrecy capacity can be found as (36).
2) Asymptotic Average Secrecy Capacity: To capture the
impact of key system parameters on the average secrecy
capacity, we proceed to analyze the asymptotic average secrecy
capacity of the system in the high SNR regime. In doing so,
we provide two novel metrics to characterize the asymptotic
average secrecy capacity, i.e., the high SNR slope and the high
SNR power offset.
Before delving into the detail analysis of the asymptotic
average secrecy capacity, we first rewrite the CDF of E as
FE (x) = 1  E (x), where
E (x) =
MX
v=1

M
v

( 1)v+1E

mEx
E
E
e
  vmExE : (37)
Then, taking into consideration (37), the average secrecy
capacity can be re-expressed as
CS =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
1  E (z)
1 + z
dz

fb(kB) (x) dx
= $1  $2; (38)
where
$1 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1 + x) fb(kB) (x) dx (39)
and
$2 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x
0
E (z)
1 + z
fb(kB) (x) dzdx: (40)
Next, we derive $1 and $2 in the high SNR regime,
respectively. When x ! 1, we have ln (1 + x)  lnx.
Hence, by substituting the PDF of b(kB) and utilizing [18,
Eq. (4.352.1)], we have
$11 =
k
ln 2

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)n
  (mBNB)
B

BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
i(1  )B i
BmBNB+i


 (mBNB + i) + ln


mB

+ log2B; (41)
where  () is the digamma function [22].
Similarly, according to [21, Eq. (19)], the asymptotic ex-
pression for $2 is derived as
$12 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
E (x)
1 + x
dx
=
1
ln 2
MX
v=1

M
v

( 1)v+1E

mE
E
E
   (E + 1)	

E + 1; E + 1;
vmE
E

: (42)
Finally, substituting (41) and (42) into (38), the asymptotic
average secrecy capacity of MIMO wiretap channels is derived
as (43).
As the conventional non-secrecy network, we also analyze
the high SNR slope and the high SNR power offset to gain
the characterization of the average secrecy capacity in the high
SNR regime. To facilitate the asymptotic analysis, we use the
following general form to express the average secrecy capacity
as
C1S = S1 (log2B   L1) ; (44)
where S1 denotes the high SNR slope in bits/s/Hz (3dB) and
L1 is the high SNR power offset in 3dB units.
According to [23]–[25], the high SNR slope is given by
S1 = lim
B!1
C1S
log2B
: (45)
Substituting (43) into (45) and performing some mathematical
manipulations, we have
S1 = 1: (46)
This result demonstrates that the key parameters, such as the
number of antennas, the number of eavesdroppers, correlation
coefficient, and fading severity parameters, have no impact on
the high SNR slope.
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E
hbt(kB)i = Z 1
0
xtfb(kB) (x) dx
= k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)
BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
  (mBNB + i)

B
mB
t
i(1  )B i  (t+mBNB + i)
B tt+mBNB+i
(26)
CS =
1
ln 2
k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)
BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
i(1  )B i
BmBNB+i
mBNB+i 1X
m=0
1
m!

mB
B
m

MX
v=0

M
v

( 1)vE

mE
E
E
  (E +m+ 1)	

E +m+ 1; E +m+ 1;

vmE
E
+
mB
B

(36)
C1S = log2B +
1
ln 2
k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)n
  (mBNB)
B
BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
i(1  )B i
BmBNB+i


 (mBNB + i) + ln


mB

  1
ln 2
MX
v=1

M
v

( 1)v+1E

mE
E
E
  (E + 1)	

E + 1; E + 1;
vmE
E

(43)
Now, we turn our attention to the high SNR power offset.
Mathematically, it can be expressed as
L1 = lim
B!1

log2B  
C1S
S1

: (47)
It is noted that (47) definitely characterizes the effect of the
main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel on the average
secrecy capacity. Hence, substituting (43) and (46) into (47),
we have
L1 = L1 (NA; NB;mB; ) + L1 (M;NE;mE) ; (48)
where
L1 (NA; NB;mB; ) =   k
ln 2

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB)

BX
i=0

B
i

  (B +mBNB)
i(1  )B i
BmBNB+i


 (mBNB + i) + ln


mB

(49)
and
L1 (M;NE;mE) = $12 : (50)
From the above analysis, we highlight that the positive effect
of the key parameters related with the main link, i.e., NA, NB,
mB, and , on the average secrecy capacity can be quantita-
tively evaluated through L1 (NA; NB;mB; ). On the other
hand, the negative effect of the key parameters related with
the eavesdropper’s link, i.e., M , NE, and mE, on the average
secrecy capacity can be characterized by L1 (M;NE;mE).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, representative numerical simulations are
provided to examine the joint impacts of the correlation coef-
ficient, the number of antennas, the number of eavesdroppers,
−5 0 5 10 15 20
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
γB (dB)
Pr
(C
S>
0)
 
 
Simulation Result
Analytical Result
γE=5dB
γE=0dB
ρ=1
ρ=0.6
ρ=0
Fig. 2. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity versus B for NA =
NB = NE = 2, mB = mE = 2, k = 2, and M = 2.
and the fading parameters on the secrecy performance. Without
loss of generality, we set the predefined rate RS = 1 and
average Eve’s SNR E = 5dB in the following simulations.
As shown in both the figures, the analytical results are in exact
agreement with the Monte Carlo simulation results and the
asymptotic curves match very well with the exact curves in
the high SNR regime, which corroborates the accuracy of our
derivation.
Fig. 2 shows the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
of MIMO wiretap channels with different average Bob’s SNR
B. It is observed that when the average Eve’s SNR E is
fixed, high feedback delay, i.e., small , slightly degrades
Pr (CS > 0). Moreover, we obtain a counter-intuitive phe-
nomenon from the figure, that is even the average SNR of
Eve’s link is higher than that of Bob’s link, a non-zero secrecy
capacity also exists.
Fig. 3 examines the impact of antenna diversity and cor-
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Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probability versus B for NA = 2, NE = 1,
mB = 1, mE = 2, k = 2, and M = 2.
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Fig. 4. The secrecy outage probability versus B for NA = 2, NB = NE =
1, mB = mE = 2, and  = 1.
relation coefficient on the secrecy outage probability of the
system. The exact and asymptotic results are obtained from
(17) and (18), respectively. We observe that increasing NB
has significant impact on the secrecy outage probability of
the considered system. This is due to the fact increasing NB
provides additional diversity order to the considered system
with feedback delay or not. In addition, as will be seen, when
 = 1, the full diversity order can be achieved, i.e., 4 and 2
for NB = 2 and NB = 1, respectively. However, when  6= 1,
the diversity order will be reduced to 2 and 1.
Figs. 4 and 5 present the impact of numbers of Eve M
and numbers of Eve’s antenna NE on the secrecy outage
probability of the system, respectively. As shown in both
figures, increasing M or NE does not influence the achievable
diversity order as indicated by the parallel slopes of the
asymptotes. However, the secrecy outage performance of the
system will be degraded by increasing M or NE due to the
reduction of the array gain. In addition, increasing the antenna
selection parameter k can significantly improve the secrecy
outage probability of the system.
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Fig. 5. The secrecy outage probability versus B for NA = NB = 2,
mB = mE = 1, k = 2, M = 2, and  = 1.
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Fig. 6. The "-outage secrecy capacity versus NA for " = 0:01, B = 20dB,
E = 5dB, NA = NB = 2, and mB = mE = 1
Fig. 6 illustrates the "-outage secrecy capacity of the system
with different NA. As can be readily observed, RS;max can
be improved by increasing the number of antennas NA at
transmitter. Furthermore, an intuitive result that the "-outage
secrecy capacity of the system improves when feedback delay
is reduced, i.e., when  increases from 0 to 1. In particular,
increasing NA has no impact on the "-outage secrecy capacity
when the CSI is completely outdated, i.e.,  = 0. This
phenomenon is consistent with the result observed in [26].
Fig. 7 depicts the average secrecy capacity versus B for
different feedback delay  and the number of antennas at Eve
NE in Nakagami-m fading channels. It is shown in this figure
that the average secrecy capacity decreases with increasing
NE, since increasing NE results in the increment of the high
power offset L1. Moreover, the higher feedback delay, i.e,
small , significantly degrades the average secrecy capacity.
In addition, in Fig. 8, we evaluate the impact of antenna
selection parameter k on the average secrecy capacity. From
the figure, antenna selection parameter k has a positive impact
on the secrecy performance, that is, increasing k results in
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Fig. 7. The average secrecy capacity versus B for NA = 2, NB = 1,
mB = mE = 1, k = 2, and M = 2.
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Fig. 8. The average secrecy capacity versus B for NA = 3, NB = 1,
NE = 2, mB = mE = 1, M = 2, and  = 1.
the increment of the average secrecy capacity owing to the
achievement of more diversity gain and coding gain.
Fig. 9 shows the effect of the number of antenna at Bob
NB and the number of eavesdroppers M on the average
secrecy capacity. As illustrated in the figure, we can see that
the average secrecy capacity is improved as increasing NB.
This is due to the fact increasing NB brings about additional
power gains via MRC at Bob. Furthermore, increasing M
also reduces the average secrecy capacity. In addition, an
interesting phenomenon that the secrecy capacity slope keeps
the same under any parameter configurations can be obtained,
which is valid for the result as in (46).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the effect of outdated
CSI on the secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels
with multiple eavesdroppers in non-identical Nakagami-m
fading. Specifically, two practical scenarios were considered,
i.e., Scenario I: Alice has no knowledge of CSI about the
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Fig. 9. The average secrecy capacity versus B for NA = 2, NE = 1,
mB = mE = 1, k = 2, and  = 1.
eavesdropper’s channel, and Scenario II: Alice has knowledge
of CSI about the eavesdropper’s channel. For Scenario I,
we have derived closed-form expressions for the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity, the secrecy outage probability,
and the "-outage secrecy capacity of the considered system
with general-order TAS/MRC scheme, which provide fast
and efficient means to evaluate the secrecy performance of
the system. Moreover, simple and informative high SNR
approximations for the secrecy outage probability was derived,
which enables us to gain further insights into the impact of
key parameters on the secrecy performance. The findings of
this paper suggest that the full diversity order, i.e., kmBNB,
can be achieved under the case of perfect CSI. However,
when the CSI is outdated, the diversity order is reduced to
mBNB, which means the transmitter diversity disappears. For
Scenario II, we also provided the exact and asymptotic closed-
form expressions for the average secrecy capacity, which make
us easily to characterize the effect of the main channel and
the eavesdropper’s channel on the average capacity through
the high SNR power offset. In addition, an un-intuitional
result that the high SNR slope is independent of all system
parameters was observed.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
According to [27], the PDF of (kB) is given by
f(kB) = k

NA
k

[FiB (x)]
k 1
[1  FiB (x)]NA kfiB (x) ;
(51)
where
fiB (x) =

mB
B
NBmB xNBmB 1
  (NBmB)
e
 mBxB (52)
and
FiB (x) = 1  e 
mBx
B
NBmB 1X
k=0
xk
k!

mB
B
k
: (53)
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fb(kB) (x) = k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB
  (mBNB) (1  )

mB
B
B+mBNB+1x

mBNB 1
2
 e 
xmB
(1 )B
Z 1
0
zB+
mBNB 1
2 e
 z

mB
(1 )B+
(NA+n k)mB
B

ImBNB 1

2mB
p
xz
(1  ) B

dz| {z }
1
(57)
1 =
  (B +mBNB)
  (mBNB)
(1  ) B
mB
p
x
e
mBx
2B(1 )

mB
B (1  )
 B mBNB2
M B mBNB2 ;
mBNB 1
2

mBx
B (1  )

(58)
Considering the relation between (kB) and b(kB), the PDF
of b(kB) can be derived as
fb(kB) (x) =
Z 1
0
fb(kB)j(kB) (xj z) f(kB) (z) dz; (54)
where
fb(kB)j(kB) (xj z) = fbiB;iB (x; z)fiB (z) : (55)
Correspondingly, the joint PDF of biB and iB is given by
[17]
fbiB;iB (x; z) =

mB
B
mBNB+1 (xz/)mBNB 12
  (mBNB) (1  )
 e ( x+z1  )
mB
B ImBNB 1

2mB
p
xz
(1  ) B

; (56)
where In () is the n-th modified Bessel function of the first
kind [18, Eq. (8.406.1)].
By combining (51)-(56) and utilizing the multinomial the-
orem, the PDF of b(kB) is expanded as (57). Resorting to
[18, Eq. (6.643.2)] and performing some simple mathemati-
cal manipulations, 1 is derived as (58), where Ma;b () is
the Whittaker-M function [18, Eq. (9.220.2)], which can be
reexpressed in terms of the polynomial as
Ma;b (z) = e
z
2
 b a  12X
k=0
C
 b a  12
k z
b+k+ 12
  (2b+ 1)
  (2b+ k + 1)
:
(59)
To this end, the desired PDF of b(kB) is given by (8) with
the help of (59). Obviously, the CDF of b(kB) can be derived
by integrating the PDF of b(kB).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
When  = 1 and B ! 1, the PDF of (kB) can be
approximated as
f(kB)  k

NA
k

mB
B
kNBmB xkNBmB 1
[  (NBmB)]
k
(NBmB)
k 1 :
(60)
Then, substituting (60) into (16) and utilizing [18, Eq.
(9.211.4)], the asymptotic secrecy outage probability result can
be derived as (18) after some mathematical manipulations.
On the other hand, when  6= 1 and B !1, we have
fb(kB) (x)  k

NA
k
 k 1X
n=0

k   1
n

( 1)nB


mB
B
mBNB   (B +mBNB) (1  )B
[  (mBNB)]
2
mBNB+B
xmBNB 1: (61)
By following the similar lines, the approximated result for
the secrecy outage probability under the case of outdated CSI
can be easily obtained after some mathematical manipulations.
REFERENCES
[1] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst.
Technol. J., vol. 28, pp. 656-715, Oct. 1949.
[2] R. Liu and W. Trappe, Securing Communications at the Physical Layer.
New York: Springer, 2010.
[3] H. V. Poor, “Information and inference in the wireless physical layer,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 40-47, Feb. 2012.
[4] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Sys. Tech. Journ., vol. 54,
pp. 1355-1387, 1975.
[5] A. Khisti and G. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas-
part II: the MIMOME wire-tap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
56, no. 11, pp. 5515-5532, Nov. 2010.
[6] F. He, H. Man, and W. Wang, “Maximal ratio diversity combining
enhanced security,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 509-511,
May 2011.
[7] M. Z. I. Sarkar and T. Ratnarajah, “Enhancing security in correlated
channel with maximal ratio combining diversity,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 6745-6751, Dec. 2012.
[8] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and I. B. Collings,
“Transmit antenna selection for security enhancement in MIMO wiretap
channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 144-154, Jan. 2013.
[9] N. Yang, P. L. Yeoh, M. Elkashlan, R. Schober, and J. Yuan, “MIMO
wiretap channels: Secure transmission using transmit antenna selection
and receive generalized selection combining,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol.
17, no. 9, pp. 1754-1757, Sep. 2013.
[10] L. Wang, M. Elkashlan, J. Huang, R. Schober, and R. K. Mallik, “Secure
transmission with antenna selection in MIMO Nakagami-m channels,”
IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 6054-6067, Nov.
2014.
[11] N. S. Ferdinand, D. B. da. Costa, and M. Latva-aho, “Effects of outdated
CSI on the secrecy performance of MISO wiretap channels with transmit
antenna selection,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 864-867,
May 2013.
[12] J. Xiong, Y. Tang, D. Ma, P. Xiao, and K. K. Wong, “Secrecy perfor-
mance analysis for TAS-MRC system with imperfect feedback,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, accepted for publication, in 2015.
[13] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. P. Petropulu, and H. V. Poor, “Improving wireless
physical layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875-1888, Mar. 2010.
[14] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless
information-theoretic security,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no.
6, pp. 2515-2534, Jun. 2008.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS 12
[15] Y. Huang, F. Al-Qahtani, C. Zhong, Q. Wu, J. Wang, and H. Alnuweiri,
“Performance analysis of multiuser multiple antenna relaying networks
with co-channel interference and feedback delay,” IEEE Trans. Com-
mun., vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 59-73, Jan. 2014.
[16] N. S. Ferdinand, N. Rajatheva, and M. Latva-aho, “Effects of feedback
delay in partial relay selection over Nakagami-m fading channels,” IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 1620-1634, May 2012.
[17] M. K. Simon and M.-S. Alouini, Digital Communications over Fading
Channels: A Unified Approach to Performance Analysis, 1st ed., New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000.
[18] I. S. Gradshteyn and I. M. Ryzhik, Table of Integrals, Series, and
Products, 7th ed. Academic Press, 2007.
[19] V. U. Prabhu and M. R. D.Rodrigues, “On wireless channels with M-
antenna eavesdroppers: Characterization of the outage probability and
"-outage secrecy capacity,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 6,
no. 3, pp. 853-860, Sep. 2011.
[20] J. Pe´rez, J. Iba´nez, L. Vielva, and I. Santamaria, “Closed-form approx-
imation for the outage capacity of orthogonal STBC,” IEEE Commun.
Lett., vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 961-963, Nov. 2005.
[21] L. Wang, N. Yang, M. Elkashlan, P. L. Yeoh, and J. Yuan, “Physical
layer security of maximal ratio combining in two-wave with diffuse
power fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 9, no.
2, pp. 247-258, Feb. 2014.
[22] M. Abramowitz and I. A. Stegun, Handbook of Mathematical Functions
With Formulas, Graphs, and Mathematical Tables, 9th ed. New York,
NY, USA: Dover, 1970.
[23] A. Lozano, A. Tulino, and S. Verdu´, “High-SNR power offset in
multiantenna communication,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 12,
pp. 4134-4151, Dec. 2005.
[24] S. Jin, M. McKay, C. Zhong, and K.-K. Wong, “Ergodic capacity
analysis of amplify-and-forward MIMO dual-hop systems,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 5, pp. 2204-2224, May 2010.
[25] R. H. Y. Louie, M. R. McKay, and I. B. Collings, “New performance
results for multiuser optimum combining in the presence of Rician
fading,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 2348-2358, Aug.
2009.
[26] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of
fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 10, pp. 4687-
4698, Oct. 2008.
[27] R. M. Radaydeh and M.-S. Alouini, “On the performance of arbitrary
transmit selection for threshold-based receive MRC with and without
co-channel interference,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 59, no. 11, pp.
3177-3191, Nov. 2011.
Yuzhen Huang received his B.S. degree in Com-
munications Engineering, and Ph.D. degree in Com-
munications and Information Systems from College
of Communications Engineering, PLA University
of Science and Technology, in 2008 and 2013 re-
spectively. He has been with College of Commu-
nications Engineering, PLA University of Science
and Technology since 2013, and currently as an
Assistant Professor. His research interests focus on
channel coding, MIMO communications systems,
cooperative communications, physical layer security,
and cognitive radio systems. He has published nearly 20 research papers in
international journals and conferences such as IEEE TCOM, IEEE TVT, IEEE
CL, WCNC, etc. He and his coauthors has been awarded a Best Paper Award
at the WCSP 2013. He received an IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS
exemplary reviewer certificate for 2014.
Fawaz S. Al-Qahtani (M’10) received the B.Sc. in
electrical engineering from King Fahad University
of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Saudi Arabia
in 2000 and his M.Sc. in Digital Communication
Systems from Monash University, Australia in 2005,
and Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Computer En-
gineering, RMIT University, Australia. Since May
2010, he has been with Texas A&M University at
Qatar, where he is an assistant research scientist.
His research interests are digital communications,
channel modeling, applied signal processing, MIMO
communication systems, cooperative communications, cognitive radio sys-
tems, and physical layer security.
Trung Q. Duong (S’05, M’12, SM’13) received his
Ph.D. degree in Telecommunications Systems from
Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH), Sweden in
2012. Since 2013, he has joined Queen’s University
Belfast, UK as a Lecturer (Assistant Professor).
His current research interests include cooperative
communications, cognitive radio networks, physical
layer security, massive MIMO, cross-layer design,
mm-waves communications, and localization for ra-
dios and networks. He is the author or co-author of
170 technical papers published in scientific journals
and presented at international conferences.
Dr. Duong currently serves as an Editor for the IEEE COMMUNICATIONS
LETTERS, IET COMMUNICATIONS, WILEY TRANSACTIONS ON EMERG-
ING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES. He has also served as the
Guest Editor of the special issue on some major journals including IEEE
JOURNAL IN SELECTED AREAS ON COMMUNICATIONS, IET COMMUNICA-
TIONS, IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS MAGAZINE, IEEE COMMU-
NICATIONS MAGAZINE, EURASIP JOURNAL ON WIRELESS COMMUNICA-
TIONS AND NETWORKING, EURASIP JOURNAL ON ADVANCES SIGNAL
PROCESSING. He was awarded the Best Paper Award at the IEEE Vehicular
Technology Conference (VTC-Spring) in 2013, IEEE International Confer-
ence on Communications (ICC) 2014.
Jinlong Wang (SM’13) received the B.S. degree
in mobile communications, M.S. degree and Ph.D.
degree in communications engineering and infor-
mation systems from Institute of Communications
Engineering, Nanjing, China, in 1983, 1986 and
1992, respectively. Since 1979, Dr. Wang has been
with the Institute of Communications Engineering,
PLA University of Science and Technology, where
he is currently a Full Professor and the Head of
Institute of Communications Engineering. He has
published over 100 papers in refereed mainstream
journals and reputed international conferences and has been granted over
20 patents in his research areas. His current research interests are the
broad area of digital communications systems with emphasis on cooperative
communication, adaptive modulation, multiple-input-multiple-output systems,
soft defined radio, cognitive radio, green wireless communications, and game
theory.
Dr. Wang also has served as the Founding Chair and Publication Chair of
International Conference on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing
(WCSP) 2009, a member of the Steering Committees of WCSP2010-2012, a
TPC member for several international conferences and a reviewer for many
famous journals. He currently is the vice-chair of the IEEE Communications
Society Nanjing Chapter and is an IEEE Senior Member.
